Director, Office of Workers\u27 Compensation Programs v. Perini North River Associates: Judicial Dilution of the Longshoremen\u27s and Harbor Workers\u27 Compensation Act\u27s  Status  Requirement by Corrada, Roberto L.
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 33 
Issue 1 Fall 1983 Article 9 
1983 
Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Perini 
North River Associates: Judicial Dilution of the Longshoremen's 
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act's "Status" Requirement 
Roberto L. Corrada 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Roberto L. Corrada, Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Perini North River Associates: 
Judicial Dilution of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act's "Status" Requirement , 
33 Cath. U. L. Rev. 245 (1984). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss1/9 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS'
COMPENSATION PROGRAMS V PERINI
NORTH RIVER ASSOCIA TES:




To protect industrial enterprises from bankrupting liability by work-
men's compensation claims, Congress has enacted various federal compen-
sation programs.' The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act2 [LHWCA] governs those industries conducting their
business on the navigable waters of the United States. The LHWCA was
passed by Congress in 1927 largely in response to judicial refusal to allow
maritime coverage by state workers' compensation programs.3 Courts had
held state programs extending coverage to workers injured on the naviga-
ble waters of the United States constitutionally impermissible because they
treaded on federal admiralty jurisdiction.4
The LHWCA of 1927 provided that to recover under the Act, a worker
must: 1) suffer a "disability or death occurring upon the navigable waters
of the United States"; 2) suffer an "accidental injury or death arising out of
1. See generally I A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW (1982 & Supp. 1983)
[hereinafter cited as 1 A. LARSON]. Workers' compensation acts generally began to appear
in the United States at the end of the nineteenth century. In 1908, Congress passed the
Federal Employers' Liability Act which applied to employees of common carriers engaged
in interstate or foreign commerce. In 1927, Congress passed the Longshoremen's and Har-
bor Workers' Compensation Act which applied to maritime workers. This Act will be the
focus of this Note. Enactment of compensation acts in the states followed the pattern of
industrial development. By 1920, all but eight states had adopted compensation acts. By
1940, 81.5% of all state and federal employees were covered by compensation acts. Id § 5.3.
2. The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act of 1927, Pub. L. No.
92-576, 44 Stat. 1424 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950) [hereinafter cited as
LHWCA].
3. See 1 NORRIS, THE LAW OF MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES § 56 (3d ed. 1975 &
Supp. 1983). Norris notes that the "application of State systems of compensation to mari-
time workers in a field already pre-empted by Congress, . . . ultimately brought about a
federal compensation law for harbor workers." Id.; see also Tucker, Coverage andProcedure
under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Subsequent to the 1972
Amendments, 55 TUL. L. REV. 1056, 1057 (1981).
4. See, e.g., South Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 212 (1917). For a discussion of
Jensen, see infra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
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and in the course of employment"; 3) be employed by a statutory em-
ployer, defined as "an employer any of whose employees are employed in
maritime employment, in whole or in part. . . ." The 1927 Act excluded
from its coverage workers who were "master[s] or member[s] of any crew,
and any person[s] engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any
vessel under 18 tons net." The Act also excluded claims for which recov-
ery may "validly be provided by State law."5 The LHWCA of 1927 had
no provision requiring a worker to have been engaged in maritime em-
ployment. The 1927 Act's coverage extended to all injuries sustained on
"actual navigable waters of the United States (including any dry dock)."6
Congress amended the LHWCA in 19727 after policymakers realized
that the 1927 Act excluded from coverage a large segment of maritime
workers who either performed most of their work on land or merely "hap-
pened" to be injured on land rather than on water.' The 1972 amend-
ments purported to remedy this problem by extending the "situs of injury"
provision of the 1927 Act to include certain adjoining land.9 They also
imposed an additional requirement that the injured worker be engaged in
maritime employment.' 0 Thus, under present law an employee must sat-
isfy both "situs of injury" and "status of injury" tests to recover under the
Act.
By adding a "status" test to the LHWCA, Congress unwittingly created
the possibility that an employee who would have been covered under the
Act before 1972 might not receive benefits after 1972 because of failure to
meet the new "status" requirement. "Nonmaritime" employees, those er-
5. LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 902, 903. See supra note 2.
6. LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. § 903(a). See supra note 2.
7. LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1976).
8. S. REP. No. 1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1972); H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. 10 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4698, 4707.
9. Section 3 of the LHWCA, as amended in 1972, provides in relevant part:
Compensation shall be payable ... only if the disability or death results from
an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any
adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other
adjoining area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing,
or building a vessel).
33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
10. Section 2(3) of the LHWCA, as amended in 1972, provides:
The term "employee" means any person engaged in maritime employment, in-
cluding any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations, and
any harbor worker including a ship repairman, ship builder, and shipbreaker, but
such term does not include a master or member of a crew of any vessel, or any
person engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any vessel under eighteen
tons net.
33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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ployees who do not hold traditional maritime positions"' but who never-
theless actually perform their work on water, present unique problems.
Although the nature of their work is not within the scope of traditional
maritime employment, an injury to a nonmaritime employee on actual
navigable waters of the United States would seem to fall within federal
admiralty jurisdiction.
In Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Perini North
RiverAssociates,'2 decided in early 1983, the United States Supreme Court
addressed the issue of "nonmaritime" employees under the LHWCA "sta-
tus" requirement. Relying largely on the legislative history of the 1972
amendments and case law interpreting the 1927 Act, the Court concluded
that "nonmaritime" employees retain their "traditional coverage" under
the LHWCA.
13
Raymond Churchill, a dockbuilder foreman for Perini North River As-
sociates, sustained injuries to the head, leg, and thumb when, in the course
of supervising the unloading of a caisson from a crane barge, a line
snapped against his leg, pitching him into the air. 4 An Administrative
Law Judge (A.L.J.) determined that Churchill was not engaged in mari-
time employment but rather in land-based construction work.'" The Bene-
fits Review Board (BRB) affirmed the A.L.J.'s decision, finding that
Churchill's employment did not have a "significant relationship to mari-
time activities."' 6 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit, holding that the BRB's position conformed with Supreme Court
precedent, denied Churchill's petition for review of the Board's decision.'
7
The Supreme Court, in an eight to one decision, reversed and held that
the LHWCA covered Churchill because he sustained injuries while actu-
ally working on navigable waters.' 8 In a concurring opinion, Justice
Rehnquist avoided the issue of "nonmaritime" employees by categorizing
Churchill as a worker engaged in longshoring activities-a traditional
11. Nonmaritime employees include those workers who are often employed on actual
navigable waters but who are not longshoremen, harbor workers or other workers engaged
in maritime employment. The most common nonmaritime workers are construction work-
ers and security guards.
12. 103 S. Ct. 634 (1983).
13. Id at 637.
14. Churchill v. Perini North River Assocs., 652 F.2d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1981).
15. Id
16. Id.
17. Id. at 256-58. The court found the BRB's interpretation consistent with the
Supreme Court's decisions in Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 715 (1980), and with
P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69 (1979). See infra notes 108-19 and accompanying text
for a discussion of these cases.
18. 103 S. Ct. at 635; see infra notes 120-44 and accompanying text.
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maritime classification. 9 Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion, as-
serted that legislative history was not sufficiently clear to permit departure
from the plain wording of the Act, which by its terms requires all employ-
ees to meet a "status" test.
20
Recently, the United States Senate passed a bill amending various sec-
tions of the LHWCA.2' Section 2(3), the "status" requirement, was
amended to exclude various shore-side activities from the scope of the
Act.22 The amendments, however, did not affect the Supreme Court deci-
sion in Perini nor did they shed any additional light on the problem of
"nonmaritime" workers injured on the navigable waters of the United
States.23
19. Id at 652 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). See infra notes 145-47 and accompanying
text.
20. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting). See infra notes 148-70 and accompanying text.
21. S.38, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG, REC. S8655 (daily ed. June 16, 1983). At the
time of this writing, a similar bill, H.R. 2816, was before the House of Representatives.
22. Id Section 2(3) was amended to read in relevant part:
The term "employee" means any person engaged in maritime employment, in-
cluding any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations, and
any harbor worker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder and ship-breaker, but
such term does not include-
(A) any ship repairman, shipbuilder, or ship-breaker engaged by employers
described in section 2(4)(B)(iii);
(B) employees exclusively performing office clerical, secretarial, security, or
data processing work;
(C) club, camp, restaurant, museum, retail outlet, and marina personnel;
(D) personnel of suppliers, transporters, or vendors temporarily doing busi-
ness on the premises of employers described in section 2(4)(A);
(E) aquaculture workers;
(F) any person engaged in operating an independently or cooperatively
owned grain elevator and who is not engaged in the loading or unloading of a
vessel;
(G) any person employed to build or repair any recreational vessel under
sixty-five feet in length;
(H) a master or member of a crew of any vessel; or
(I) any person engaged by a master to load or unload or repair any small
vessel under eighteen tons net;
if employees described in clauses (A) through (G) are subject to coverage under
a State workers' compensation law.
Id.
23. 129 CONG. REc. S8662 (daily ed. June 16, 1983) (statement of Sen. Hatch). Senator
Hatch indicated that:
[T]he committee has not given any consideration to the Perini decision. Instead,
the committee report reiterates the position adopted in the preceding Congress as
to jurisdictional changes. Briefly, the committee did not attempt an overall evalua-
tion or rationalization of the existing body of statutory and decisional law. ...
Except for . . . limited changes, the committee decided not to endorse or reject,
explicitly or implicitly, a large body of decisional law relative to traditional mari-
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This Note will provide an historical overview of judicial interpretation
of the LHWCA. Particular emphasis will be placed on the reasoning be-
hind the passage of the original 1927 Act and its subsequent amendment in
1972. An analysis of Perini will suggest a Supreme Court formulation of
the LHWCA harmonious with constitutional guidelines governing admi-
ralty jurisdiction but which ignores the plain meaning of the Act. The
Note will conclude with a discussion of the possible impact of Perini and
the future of the LHWCA "status" requirement.
I. LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE LHWCA
A. Pre-LHWCA: The Birth of State Funded Workers' Compensation
Programs
Between 1902 and 1920 states began to develop workmen's compensa-
tion programs.24 Many of these statutes did not provide comprehensive
coverage, but some included maritime workers.25 In South Pacific Co. v.
Jensen,26 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of state compen-
sation laws but struck down their application to those injured during the
course of employment on the navigable waters of the United States.
27
Reasoning that the imposition of one state's workers' compensation law on
vessels and workers of other states would undermine uniformity of mari-
time matters under the Constitution,28 the Jensen Court left maritime
workers without a remedy by opening a gap in coverage of state workers'
compensation laws.
Five years later, the Supreme Court attempted to ease the burden Jensen
time employment .... [T]he committee's intentionally nondecisive stance clearly
should not be construed as presumptive adoption of Perini.
Id
24. See I A. LARSON, supra note 1, at §§ 5.2-.3. Although some of these programs
provided for comprehensive coverage, most were limited either to a particular field or to
"hazardous" employment. Some of these workers' compensation acts were bold enough to
impose no-fault liability on the employer. Not surprisingly, suits were brought alleging a
variety of constitutional challenges to these statutes. Id
25. See IA JHIRAD, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 2 (7th ed. rev. 1982) [hereinafter cited
as 1A BENEDICT). BENEDICT notes that when workers' compensation statutes were enacted
in the various states, it was uncertain whether maritime workers would be covered by them.
However, while the constitutionality of these statutes was being litigated, many maritime
employers voluntarily complied with the new state compensation statutes. Id
26. 244 U.S. 205 (1917). Jensen involved a claim under the New York Workmen's
Compensation Act by a widow whose husband was killed when he broke his neck during the
course of transporting lumber from a ship to a pier. Id at 208.
27. Id. at 217-18.
28. Id at 218.
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imposed on maritime employees. In Grant Smith-Porter Co. v. Rohde,29 a
carpenter sustained injuries while engaged in construction work on a ship
in a harbor. In upholding the application of a state workers' compensation
law to the carpenter, the Court held that as to certain "maritime but local"
matters30 having no "direct relation to navigation or commerce," the ap-
plication of state law does not materially affect federal maritime authority
established under the Constitution.
Thus, whereas before Rohde a line defining the boundary between state
and federal jurisdiction could be drawn at the water's edge,32 after Rohde
one had to guess at the meaning of "maritime but local" in order to at-
tempt to define this boundary. The Supreme Court's failure to fashion an
equitable rule and its constant call for federal legislative action33 finally
brought Congress to the aid of maritime workers left without a remedy.
B. The LHWCA of 1927: Congress Fills the Gap
Congress passed the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensa-
tion Act in 1927 3 after two unsuccessful attempts to authorize extension of
state remedies to maritime workers. 35 The remedy Congress provided
placed strict coverage requirements on workers wishing to recover under
29. 257 U.S. 469 (1922).
30. "Local matter" was left undefined by the Rohde Court. The term suggested any
maritime injury that occurred over water but not while performing a task directly related to
navigation or commerce on navigable waters. However, the Rohde Court's application of
the term "local matters" must be viewed in the narrow context of an unusual contractual
provision in which both parties had agreed to be bound by the state workmen's compensa-
tion law. It is not clear in Rohde whether the Court, in using the term "local matters," was
referring to the contractual agreement or to the nature of the worker's employment. Id. at
477. For a general discussion of the "maritime but local" doctrine, see IA BENEDICT, supra
note 25, at § 6.
31. 257 U.S. at 477. This language was borrowed from an earlier Supreme Court deci-
sion, Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921), involving a stevedore who was killed
on a ship anchored in a bay when coal was negligently allowed to fall on him.
32. This original line drawn at the water's edge is often referred to as the "Jensen line."
See, e.g., Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 259 (1977); Tucker, supra
note 3, at 1057.
33. See Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 164 (1920); Washington v.
Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924). The Dawson Court noted:
Without doubt Congress has power to alter, amend or revise the maritime law by
statutes of general application embodying its will and judgement. This power, we
think, would permit enactment of a general employers' liability law or general pro-
visions for compensating injured employees; but it may not be delegated to the
several States.
264 U.S. at 227.
34. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
35. See generally Dawson, 264 U.S. at 219; Knickerbocker, 253 U.S. at 149.
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the Act.36 Additionally, to allow state compensation schemes to operate to
their fullest extent, Congress codified the "maritime but local" doctrine in
section 3(a) of the Act by ordering that compensation not be paid if relief
could "validly be provided by state law."37 Presumably, then, a worker
could not recover under the Act unless he showed his work had a direct
relation to navigation or commerce upon navigable waters. In allowing
the vague "maritime but local" doctrine to determine the line between
state and federal coverage, Congress created an unworkable and unpre-
dictable standard.38 Thus, passage of the LHWCA was not the panacea
hoped for by the courts. Rather, it required courts to attempt to remedy
constitutionally legitimate claims without violating the strictures of the
Act.
39
36. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
37. Section 3(a) of the 1927 Act provides in relevant part that, "[c]ompensation shall be
payable ... if recovery for the disability or death through workmen's compensation pro-
ceedings may not validly be provided by State law." 44 Stat. 1424, 1426. The only reason
compensation for an injury occurring on navigable waters might "validly" be provided by
state law instead of federal law would be that the work involved was so "local in character"
that it did not disturb the uniformity of maritime matters under the Constitution. In provid-
ing an exception for local matters, commentators have suggested that Congress codified the
"maritime but local" doctrine. See, e.g., IA BENEDICT, supra note 25, at § 7 ("[T]he con-
gressional draftsmen [of the 1927 Act] took refuge in finding a formula which on the face of
it appeared to reflect in statutory language the effect of the Jensen rule as modified by the
'maritime but local' doctrine."); Note, Coverage Under the LHWC,4 Amendments of 1972:
Developing A Practical, Uniformly Applicable Interpretation of the Status Requirement, 18
WM. & MARY L. REV. 555, 559 n.27 (1977) ("The restriction that federal compensation was
not obtainable if recovery could be validly provided by state law essentially incorporated the
'maritime but local' doctrine originating in pre-1927 Supreme Court decisions into the 1927
Act.").
38. See Holland v. Harrison Bros. Dry Dock and Repair Yard, 306 F.2d 369 (5th Cir.
1962). The Holland court stated that "[a]lthough the Act chartered a course for thousands of
workers, many weary and frustrated litigants were unable to navigate the legal complexities
of state and maritime jurisdiction, misjudged their course, and pursued the wrong rem-
edy .. " Id at 371. See also Tucker, supra note 3, at 1059 ("only a soothsayer with a
crystal ball could tell on which side of the jurisdictional line a claimant should fall"). See
also IA BENEDICT, supra note 25, at § 8 (noting that employers also suffered from the uncer-
tainties perpetuated by the LHWCA because "[a]n employer who had believed himself to be
governed by the state law and contributed to the state insurance fund could find that his
contributions afforded him no protection if a court held that the federal law applied "). But
cf. 4 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 89.22 (1983) [hereinafter cited as 4 A.
LARSON]. Larson suggests that a distinction was drawn between those employees involved
in "local" work and those involved in work affecting commerce on navigable waters. Con-
struction work done by an artisan (plumber, painter, carpenter) on an uncompleted vessel
did not "affect commerce" and thus did not trigger federal admiralty jurisdiction. Mainte-
nance work done on a completed vessel, however, did "affect commerce" and thus came
under federal jurisdiction.
39. The constitutional limit of federal jurisdiction was determined by Jensen to be at the
water's edge. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. However, the LHWCA narrowed
19831
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After thirteen years of conflicting decisions on the extent of coverage of
the LHWCA, the Supreme Court decided Parker v. Motor Boat Sales.
40
In Parker, a nonmaritime employee, hired primarily as a janitor and
porter, drowned while testing one of his employer's outboard motors on a
boat trip.4 ' Troubled that an injury occurring squarely on navigable wa-
ters might not be covered by the LHWCA,42 the Supreme Court held that
the Act was intended to encompass any employee injured while employed
on the navigable waters of the United States regardless of whether the
workers' activities on those waters were traditionally maritime in nature.43
Upon a closer examination of the facts of Parker, particularly as explained
in the circuit court opinion, the Court appears to have deemed the janitor
covered under the Act because of equitable reasons irrelevant to the legal
issues before the Court. In Parker, the petitioner could not recover under
Virginia State law because his employer did not employ the requisite
number of workers under the Virginia compensation act.44 Nevertheless,
Parker's retreat to the Jensen line of demarcation at the water's edge indi-
cated an end to the "maritime but local" doctrine.45
the scope of federal jurisdiction by allowing state laws to penetrate past the water's edge to
cover workers whose employment was "local in character." See supra note 37. Thus, after
passage of the Act, some workers with constitutionally legitimate claims were not covered by
the Act.
40. 314 U.S. 244 (1941).
41. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the janitor's
widow could not recover benefits under the LHWCA because the janitor was not acting
pursuant to his employment at the time of the accident, and because the janitor's employ-
ment was so "local in character" as to be valid under the state workmen's compensation act.
Id at 245-46 (discussing Motor Boat Sales v. Parker, 116 F.2d 789 (4th Cir. 1941)). Al-
though the circuit court ruling seemed to follow exactly the analysis prescribed by the Act,
the Supreme Court reversed.
42. The Court evinced its concern that any worker injured on navigable waters should
be covered by federal law in stating that "even in the absence of any Congressional action,
federal jurisdiction is exclusive and state action forbidden in an area, which, although of
shadowy limits, doubtless embraces the case before us." Parker, 314 U.S. at 247-48.
43. Id at 250.
44. See Motor Boat Sales, Inc. v. Parker, 116 F.2d 789 (4th Cir. 1941). The Fourth
Circuit indicated that Motor Boat Sales, Inc. was not subject to the Virginia Workmen's
Compensation Act "because it did not employ the minimum number of employees [neces-
sary] to bring it under the Virginia statute." Id at 793. The fact that the janitor was not
covered under the relevant state act meant that his widow would recover no benefits at all if
the Supreme Court decided against LHWCA coverage.
45. See 1 NORRIS, supra note 3, at § 60. Norris notes that in finding in favor of
LHWCA coverage of a nonmaritime employee, the Parker Court appeared to retreat from
the "maritime but local" doctrine. See also Note, Journey Into The Twilight Zone, 23 Loy.
L. REV. 504, 507 (1977), arguing that the Parker decision "appeared to deal a serious blow to
the maritime but local doctrine, for the relation to navigation and commerce of a casual and
unauthorized ride in a small outboard motor boat approached the vanishing point." Id.
[Vol. 33:245
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Perhaps as a result of the unique facts of Parker, the Supreme Court
announced the novel "twilight zone" rule just one year later in Davis v.
Department of Labor and Industries of Washington .46 The "twilight zone"
rule signaled the definitive end to the "maritime but local" doctrine.47 In
Davis, a structural steel worker, employed to examine steel loaded onto a
derrick barge, drowned when he fell or was knocked into the water. The
Court, attempting to clarify the jurisdictional uncertainty between state
and federal remedies,48 stated that there is a "twilight zone" in which an
employee's claims might be covered by either state or federal law.49 Ac-
knowledging that justice could not be served by such a jurisdictional
guessing game, the Supreme Court held that cases falling into this "twi-
light zone" of concurrent coverage should presumptively be covered by
state, rather than federal, law." ° Although Davis clearly eased the burden
on employees, employers, and the courts confronted with LHWCA cover-
age cases, the Davis Court controverted the specific wording of the Act by
allowing state statutes to encroach upon the exclusive federal jurisdiction
over maritime injuries established in section 5 of the 1927 Act. 1
46. 317 U.S. 249 (1942).
47. In setting up a "zone" of concurrent juridiction where both state and federal law
might apply, the Supreme Court eliminated the need to inquire into the "local" character of
an employee's work. See 4 A. LARSON, supra note 38, at § 89.24 (The revolutionary aspect
of the Davis decision was that "no attempt was made to reach [a result] by an extension of
the 'local concern' doctrine.").
48. For a full discussion of the Act's vague boundary line, see supra note 38 and accom-
panying text.
49. 317 U.S. at 256.
50. In upholding its novel decision to extend a presumption of state coverage towards
maritime employees whose claims fell within the "twilight zone" of concurrent jurisdiction,
the Supreme Court analogized the conflict between state acts and the LHWCA to conflicts
between state enactments regulating interstate commerce and the commerce clause of the
United States Constitution. The Davis Court noted that courts make factual judgments to
determine whether particular state acts unduly burden interstate commerce by relying heav-
ily on the presumption of constitutionality in favor of the state act. Id at 257; accord South
Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938) (upholding a state statute
prohibiting the use of certain motor trucks on state highways as a restriction reasonably
adapted to the ends of conserving highways and promoting safety). But see 4 A. LARSON,
supra note 38, at § 89.24. Despite the Davis Court's clear language and relevant analogies,
Larson has interpreted the Davis ruling as providing for a presumption of constitutionality
in favor of coverage of the first act, state or federal, under which application is made by the
claimant.
51. 317 U.S. at 261 (Stone, J., dissenting). Section 5 of the LHWCA of 1927, provided
in relevant part that: "The liability of an employer [under the Act] shall be exclusive and in
the place of all other liability of such employer to such employee." 33 U.S.C. § 905, 44 Stat.
1424, 1426 (1927). This provision of exclusivity of the LHWCA found in § 5 would seem to
prohibit employer liability under a state act if the employee could be covered by the
LHWCA, thus contradicting the validity of concurrent jurisdiction theories under the Act.
19831
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Twenty years after Davis, the Court, in Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance
Co. ,52 answered the jurisdictional question posed by Davis regarding the
limits of state and federal law. Calbeck modified Davis so that state and
federal law shared concurrent jurisdiction only to the extent that state law
could validly penetrate past the water line to cover workers injured on nav-
igable waters.5 3 The Calbeck interpretation of section 3(a)'s requirement
that recovery may not validly be provided by state law eliminated the con-
fusing effect of the "maritime but local" doctrine. Calbeck rendered sec-
tion 3(a) superfluous because a worker could now recover under either
federal or state law regardless of whether the nature of an injured em-
ployee's work was "local in character."
The Supreme Court squared its decision in Calbeck with its rulings in
Parker and Davis by focusing on the impact of those decisions on federal
law. The Court declared that, like Calbeck, Parker and Davis repudiated
the "maritime but local" doctrine by holding that the true line of federal
jurisdiction under the LHWCA was at the water's edge.54
By drawing the line of federal jurisdiction at the water's edge, the
Parker, Calbeck, and Davis decisions gradually made the 1927 Act and its
confusing section 3(a) requirement consistent with constitutional notions
of federal admiralty jurisdiction. Together, these cases permitted any em-
52. 370 U.S. 114 (1962).
53. Id at 126-27 (emphasis added). The Court also stated that Congress did not intend
to carve out an exemption for areas of "local concern", disclaiming what most courts and
commentators believed to be the purpose of § 3(a) of the 1927 Act. See supra note 37 and
accompanying text. The Calbeck Court asserted that Congress inserted § 3(a) in the 1927
Act because the constitutionality of congressional delegation of admiralty jurisdiction to the
states had been repudiated twice before enactment of the LHWCA. In the Calbeck Court's
view, this section functioned only to save the Act from judicial condemnation by making it
clear that this time Congress did not intend to legislate beyond its constitutional power. Id
at 129-30.
This unique interpretation of the rationale for the addition of § 3(a) is consistent with the
Act's legislative history. In its original form, § 3(a) exactly followed the language of the
"maritime but local" doctrine by providing an exception for "employment of local concern
and of no direct relation to navigation and commerce." The Senate, however, rejected this
language, presumably because of the uncertainties in coverage provided by the "local con-
cern" doctrine. Calbeck, 370 U.S. at 122-23. See Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee on S, 3170, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 95 (1927) (The Senate indicated that the original
wording of § 3(a) was indefinite. The Senate provided that "[tihe exception of 'employment
of local concern and of no direct relation to navigation and commerce' is vague and will be
the subject of continual litigation").
54. Ca/beck, 370 U.S. at 127-29. See also supra note 43 and accompanying text. But see
4 A. LARSON, supra note 38, at § 89.26. Larson states that "[a]ctually the entire twilight zone
development, from Parker through Davis to Calbeck was concerned, not with the navigable
waters boundary line, but with the absence-of-state-power boundary line" as codified in
§ 3(a) of the Act.
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ployee injured on navigable waters to recover under the LHWCA, regard-
less of the nature of their work. Even as the jurisdictional issue was being
settled, however, it became apparent that Congress would have to amend
the Act to encompass an increasingly large segment of maritime workers
whose employment required them to be both on land and over water.
55
C. The LHWCA Amendments of 1972. Congress Accepts the Judicial
Invitation to Expand the Scope of the Act
Congress amended the LHWCA in 1972 to upgrade the benefits pro-
vided under the LHWCA and to extend coverage to protect maritime
workers in certain shoreside areas because of the limited benefits provided
under most state workers' compensation acts.56 The 1972 amendments ex-
panded the territorial coverage of the Act specifically to include the contig-
uous dock area of navigable waters of the United States. 7 In addition, the
amendments added a "status" provision requiring anyone covered under
the Act to have been engaged in "maritime employment" at the time of
injury.58 Thus, the plain wording of the amendments required that in or-
der to recover under the Act, a worker must be injured within a proper
situs and be engaged in maritime employment.
The Senate and House committees considering the amendments pub-
lished identical reports detailing the amendments' impact on the Act. 59
The committee reports did not specifically define the word "maritime em-
ployment" as used in the new "status" test; however, the narrow examples
used by the reports to describe the limits of the "status" requirement clari-
fied Congress' intended use of the term.
The reports evince a consistent concern only for longshoremen.6 ° The
term "maritime employment" is used only in context with other more spe-
55. Seven years after Calbeck, the Supreme Court decided Nacirema Operating Co. v.
Johnson, 396 U.S. 212 (1969). In Nacirema, one longshoreman was killed and two others
injured on piers permanently affixed to the shore. In holding that the LHWCA never ap-
plies unless an injury occurs upon actual navigable waters of the United States, the Supreme
Court stated that there was "much to be said for uniform treatment of longshoremen injured
while loading or unloading a ship." Id at 223. The Court concluded, however, that an
invitation to move the boundary line of the Act landward would have to "be addressed to
Congress, not to this Court." Id at 224. Congress accepted the invitation three years later.
56. S. REP. 1125, supra note 8, at 1.
57. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
58. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
59. S. REP., supra note 8; H.R. REp. supra note 8.
60. S. REP., supra note 8, at 13; H.R. REP., supra note 8, at 10. The committee reports
suggested that a major reason for LHWCA's landward extension was "that with the advent
of modem cargo-handling techniques, such as containerization and the use of LASH-type
vessels, more of the longshoremen's work is, performed on land than here-to-fore." Id
1983]
Catholic University Law Review
cific terms such as longshoreman, ship builder, or shipbreaker.6 ' In setting
out examples of persons who might be covered or excluded by the 1972
amendments,62 the broadest example given is the occupation of "checker."
The reports state that "checkers" may be covered under the LHWCA only
to the extent that they are "directly involved in loading or unloading.
63
Thus, the reports' language indicates that a worker not specifically in-
volved in loading or unloading must show a direct relationship to that ac-
tivity in order to be covered, much like the requirements of the early
"maritime but local" doctrine.' Finally, the reports state that the commit-
tees did not intend to "cover employees who are not engaged in loading,
unloading, repairing, or building a vessel, just because they are injured in
an area adjoining navigable waters used for such activity."' 65 Nowhere
does Congress suggest that nonmaritime employees such as construction
workers, security guards or even janitors are intended to either benefit
from the expansion of the Act or be included under the maritime employ-
ment requirement. Moreover, the plain wording of the Act suggests that
all employees be engaged in "maritime employment." Although the legis-
lative history of the 1972 amendments did not specifically indicate what
impact Congress intended the term "maritime employment" to have on
those injured on navigable waters, Congress arguably intended to include
only a narrow class of workers within the scope of the Act.66
Although the considerations influencing the passage of the amendments
were documented in a comprehensive manner by the committee reports,
the addition of the "status" provision necessarily raised questions unan-
61. S. REP.,supra note 8, at 13; H.R. REP., supra note 8, at 10. "[T]he bill would amend
the Act to provide coverage of longshoremen, harbor workers, ship repairmen, ship builders,
shipbreakers, and other employees engaged in maritime employment. Id.; see also
infra note 153 and accompanying text.
62. Id Congress gave a positive example of workers who would be covered: "To take a
typical example, cargo. . . is typically unloaded from the ship and immediately transported
to a storage or holding area. . . . The employees who perform this work would be covered
under this bill." Id Congress also gave a few specific examples of workers who would not
be covered: "[E]mployees whose responsibility is only to pick up stored cargo for further
trans-shipment would not be covered, nor would purely clerical employees whose jobs do
not require them to participate in the loading or unloading of cargo." Id
63. S. REP., supra note 8, at 13; H.R. REP., supra note 8, at 11.
64. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
65. S. REP., supra note 8, at 13; H.R. REP., supra note 8, at 11.
66. See 4 A. LARSON, supra note 38, at § 89.41. Larson suggests that there was no
"status" test before 1972 because the number of cases where railway workers, truckers or
deliverymen crossed onto navigable waters was not large enough to cause concern. Larson
states, however, that "when the covered situs was expanded ... it became obvious that
some additional limitation had to be superimposed to prevent coverage of every trucker or
railway worker that entered a terminal. . . . The solution chosen was to place a special
limitation on the definition of 'employee."' Id
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swered by legislative history about the extent to which the 1972 amend-
ments had changed the original Act. Although there was no question that
the amended Act continued to cover longshoremen, harbor workers, ship
builders, ship repairers, and other maritime workers specifically mentioned
by Congress, controversy arose in the courts over whether nonmaritime
employees, such as construction workers and security guards, who would
have been covered under the original Act, were still covered after the 1972
amendments.67
Because the legislative history was inconclusive as to whether Congress
intended to retain coverage of nonmaritime employees under the new
amendments, federal courts adopted diverse interpretations. 6' The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which has considered many
claims under the LHWCA, has taken an expansive approach to the prob-
lem, maintaining that Congress did not intend to withdraw coverage from
those employees "traditionally covered" by the LHWCA.69 Other circuits
have taken a restrictive approach based on a narrow reading of the amend-
ments. They have contended that the insertion of a new status require-
ment could mean only that Congress intended to restrict coverage to those
employees whose work is maritime in nature.7°
67. See Tucker, supra note 3, at 1068-69. "The Senate Committee Report ... indi-
cated. . . Congress intended to cover only those employees engaged in loading and unload-
ing vessels. . . . Otherwise, the courts were free to develop their own tests to determine the
class of workers covered by the Act." Id
68. See IA BENEDICT, supra note 25, at § 16(a). BENEDICT notes that Congress failed
to define clearly the exact terms of the "status" test. "[T]he critical terms in section 2(3)--
'maritime employment', 'longshoremen' and 'longshoring operations'-are nowhere defined
in the Act." Id BENEDICT concludes that because of congressional silence, the courts of
appeals, in first confronting the limitations of the status test, "failed to arrive at a uniform
method of analysis and, indeed, had set forth contradictory theories, each one providing a
different point of reference." Id For specific examples of this thesis, see Stockman v. John
T. Clark & Son, 539 F.2d 264 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1977) (court must
examine the nature of the worker's regularly assigned duties); Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v.
Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1976), affd sub nom. Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v.
Caputo, 432 U.S. 249 (1977) (court must determine whether an employee had spent a signifi-
cant amount of his time performing longshore duties); Sea Land Serv. Inc. v. Director,
O.W.C.P., 540 F.2d 629 (3d Cir. 1976) (worker's duties must be linked to maritime employ-
ment); Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Perdue, 539 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1976), vacated and
remanded sub nom. Director, O.W.C.P. v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 433 U.S. 904 (1977), aff'd,
575 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1978) (worker must play an "integral" part in a longshoring operation
to satisfy the "status" test).
69. See, e.g., Boudreaux v. American Workover, Inc., 680 F.2d 1034 (5th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 815 (1983). See infra notes 91-103 and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., Graziano v. General Dynamics, 663 F.2d 340 (1st Cir. 1981); Lynn v. Heyl
& Patterson, Inc., 483 F. Supp. 1247 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd without opinion, 636 F.2d 1209 (3d Cir.
1980); Fusco v. Perini North River Associates, 622 F.2d 1111 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1131 (1981); I.T.O. Corp. v. Benefits Review Bd., 529 F.2d 1080 (4th Cir. 1975), modi-
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1. The Narrow Approach: Judicial Alignment with the Actual Wording
of the 1972 Amendments
The earliest interpretation of the 1972 "status" requirement adhered
closely to the plain wording of the Act.7 In Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Gil-
more,71 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit consid-
ered the case of a logger who was injured when he fell from a floating
walkway into a "pond" area for logs next to a salt water bay. The Ninth
Circuit held that the logger was not engaged in maritime employment at
the time of injury and, therefore, was not entitled to benefits under the
LHWCA.73 The Weyerhaeuser court took a restrictive view of the 1972
amendments, concluding that in expanding the situs covered by the Act,
"Congress clearly did not intend to broaden the class of covered employees
to include anyone injured in an adjoining area."'74 Asserting that the pre-
1972 judicial history of the Act was irrelevant because the 1972 amend-
ments "radically changed" the basis for coverage under the LHWCA,75
the court determined that the intent of Congress in extending the Act was
not to cover all employees injured while working over water but, rather, to
"minimize the adverse effect of a shoreside location or situs when a mari-
time employee is injured."76 Arguing that the reason for the LHWCA was
to provide relief for those subject to the "traditional hazards of ship's serv-
ice," the Ninth Circuit concluded that to recover under the Act, an em-
ployee's work must have a realistic relationship to the traditional duties of
ship's service.7 The Weyerhaeuser court stated that a broader interpreta-
fled, 542 F.2d 903 (1976) (en banc); Weyerhaeuser v. Gilmore, 528 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 868 (1976). See infra notes 71-78.
71. Weyerhaeuser, 528 F.2d at 959 ("So far as we are advised, no court has yet con-
strued or given a definition to the phrase ['engaged in maritime employment'] ....
72. 528 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1975).
73. Id at 962.
74. Id at 960 (emphasis in original).
75. Id. "We relegate those [pre-1972] decisions to limbo because it is obvious to us that
the 1972 amendments radically changed the basis for an employee's entitlement to federal
compensation." Id
76. Id. at 961 (emphasis in original). In support of its restrictive view the court quoted
Representative William Steiger who argued, in debate before the House of Representatives,
that "the expansion of coverage [of the Act] is intended to bring about a measure of compen-
sation uniformly applicable to persons customarily considered to be working in the business.
Thus,. . . an employee. . . will be covered as long as he is working as a longshoreman or
harbor worker. ... Id at 960; see also 118 CONG. REC. 36,385 (1972) (emphasis added by
court).
77. 528 F.2d at 961. In formulating its "significant relationship" test, the Weyerhaeuser
court relied on three sources: Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249
(1972); Olney v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 488 F.2d 758 (4th Cir. 1973); Crosson v.
Vance, 484 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1973). Executive Jet was the seminal case originating this
analysis. Executive Jet involved airline workers who were injured when their jet aircraft
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tion would act to nullify the clear language of "maritime employment"
and, in effect, cause it to read "any employment."78
Shortly after the Weyerhaeuser decision the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit considered I TO. Corp. v. Benefits Review
Board7 9  In ITO. Corp., three workers were injured in the course of
transporting items in the storage area of a marine terminal. Although the
injuries did not occur over water and did not involve nonmaritime em-
ployees, the Fourth Circuit's arguments for a narrow view of the "status"
requirement are significant. Citing a 1914 case8" and with no apparent
reference to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Weyerhaeuser, the Fourth Cir-
cuit stated that "'[m]aritime employment' is a phrase that embodies the
concept of a direct relation to a vessel's navigation and commerce."'" Ad-
ditionally, the ITO. Corp. court concluded that the effect of the 1972
amendments was to broaden the territory covered by the Act, and to nar-
row the class of persons eligible for benefits by the imposition of a "status"
test.8 2 I TO. Corp. and Weyerhaeuser thus provided initial impetus for
the subsequent adoption of the narrow view of the 1972 "status" provision
by other circuits.8 3
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit first articu-
lated its view of the 1972 amendments in Fusco v. Perini North River Asso-
crash landed and sunk in the navigable waters of Lake Erie. The Supreme Court held that
federal admiralty jurisdiction under the Act exists with regard to aviation tort claims "only
when there is a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity." 409 U.S. at 249.
78. 528 F.2d at 961.
79. 529 F.2d 1080 (4th Cir. 1975), modified, 542 F.2d 903 (1976) (en banc).
80. Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52 (1914). The Fourth Circuit devel-
oped a restrictive "significant relationship" test similar to that developed by the Ninth Cir-
cuit. . TO. Corp., 529 F.2d at 1084. Unlike the Ninth Circuit, however, the Fourth Circuit
did not rely on the Supreme Court's decision in Executive Jet. It instead relied on Imbrovek,
234 U.S. 52 (1914). In Imbrovek, a stevedore, engaged in loading and stowing copper on a
ship, was injured when an iron crossbeam accidentally struck him. In holding that the steve-
dore came under federal admiralty jurisdiction, the Supreme Court stated that "the relation
of the wrong to maritime service, to navigation and to commerce on navigable waters, [is]
quite sufficient." 234 U.S. at 62.
81. 529 F.2d at 1084.
82. Id. at 1083.
83. See, e.g., Odom Constr. Co. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 622 F.2d 110, 113 (5th
Cir. 1980) ("[W]here the job being done clearly had a realistically significant relationship to
'traditional maritime activity involving navigation and commerce on navigable waters'...
[employee's] work at the time of his injury was maritime."). Dravo Corp. v. Banks, 567 F.2d
593, 595 (3d Cir. 1977) ("[Employee's] duties have no traditional maritime characteristics,
but rather are typical of the support services performed in any production entity, maritime
or not."); Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son, 539 F.2d 264, 277 (1st Cir. 1976) ("We read the
language of the committee reports as requiring bona fide membership in a class of employ-
ees whose members would for the most part have been covered some of the time under the
earlier Act.").
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ciates.84 In Fusco, a construction laborer was injured while engaged in the
construction of a substructure for a sewage disposal plant which was to
extend over navigable waters. The Fusco court stressed that "maritime
employment" as used in the 1972 amendments was an occupational, not a
geographic concept, suggesting that the focus of the "status" test should be
on the nature of the employee's occupation regardless of where he per-
forms it.85 Reasoning that the construction worker's activities had no sig-
nificant relationship to navigation or commerce on navigable waters, the
Second Circuit held that the worker failed to satisfy the "status" require-
ment and, thus, was not entitled to benefits under the Act.86
The significant number of circuits following the Weyerhaeuser analysis
of the 1972 "status" requirement proves the broad base of support that
exists for a view of the 1972 amendments that would deny coverage to any
injured workers who could not meet a "significant relationship" test.
However, because this restrictive view presumably subjects many workers
to the hardships of inadequate state compensation, it was not surprising
that one circuit switched to an expansive view of the LHWCA which
would allow coverage to any worker injured on navigable waters regard-
less of "status". 87
2 The Broad Approach: A Searchfor the Meaning of the 1972
"Status" Test
The broad approach to the 1972 "status" test is characterized by an
alternative reading of the legislative history of the LHWCA highlighting
congressional omissions, a liberal reading of the actual wording of the
"status" test, and a reliance on earlier interpretations by the Supreme
Court,8 the Department of Labor, 89 and the Benefits Review Board.9°
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had initially
followed the restrictive Weyerhaeuser line of cases.9 ' In an abrupt depar-
84. 622 F.2d 1111 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1131 (1981). The Second Circuit
also considered Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Perini at the appel-
late level. See supra note 14.
85. 622 F.2d at 1112.
86. Id at 1113.
87. Boudreaux v. American Workover, Inc., 680 F.2d 1034 (5th Cir. 1982). See infra
notes 91-103 and accompanying text.
88. See infra notes 104-19 and accompanying text.
89. See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
90. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
91. See, e.g., Miller v. Central Dispatch, 673 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1981). Miller involved
an employee who worked on land but was required to be on board a ship five to six times
per day. The employee was injured aboard ship while guarding a ship detainee. Although
the Fifth Circuit held that the employee was covered by the LHWCA, it stated that the
[Vol. 33:245
Judicial Dilution of LHWCA
ture in 1982, however, the court decided Boudreaux v. American
Workover.92 In Boudreaux, a wireline rigger on a drilling barge in inland
waters was injured during the course of his employment. Finding that the
rigger was entitled to benefits under the LHWCA, the Fifth Circuit con-
cluded that "the 1972 change in the definition of 'employee,' section 2(3),
was not intended to withdraw coverage from those previously considered
to be in 'maritime employment' for purposes of LHWCA coverage. 93
The Boudreaux court stressed earlier Supreme Court cases94 interpreting
the 1972 amendments in developing its broad approach to the LHWCA.
Although these cases dealt exclusively with land-based employees covered
under the expanded shoreside situs of the Act, the Fifth Circuit noted that
in upholding coverage under the Act, the Supreme Court consistently af-
forded the LHWCA a liberal construction. 95 Maintaining that this broad
view also had the support of the Benefits Review Board,96 the Director of
"status" test requires an analysis of "whether the [employee's] work is maritime, that is,
whether the employee's activities had a realistically significant relationship to traditional
maritime activity." Id at 781; see also Pippen v. Shell Oil, 661 F.2d 378, 382 (5th Cir. 1981)
(wire-line operator working aboard a drilling barge); Gilliam v. Wiley N. Jackson Co., 659
F.2d 54, 56-57 (5th Cir. 1981) (construction foreman employed in construction of bridge
over waterway); Hullinghorst Indus., Inc., v. Carroll, 650 F.2d 750, 756 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982) (employee injured while erecting scaffolding beneath pier);
Trotti & Thompson Co. v. Crawford, 631 F.2d 1214, 1221 (5th Cir. 1980) (construction
worker injured building a pier); Odom Constr. Co. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 622 F.2d
110, 113 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966 (1981) (employee injured while perform-
ing land-based construction repair on mooring blocks in a canal).
92. 680 F.2d 1034 (5th Cir. 1982).
93. Id at 1042. The court's analysis of the 1972 legislative history is critical to a broad
reading of the LHWCA. If one interprets the legislative history as showing a congressional
intent not to exclude workers previously covered by the Act then, presumably, any worker
injured on a water situs would satisfy the "status" test because the "status" test did not exist
before 1972. Cf 4 A. LARSON, supra note 38, at § 89.27(c). Larson notes:
It is not difficult to reconstruct the reason why the enlarged situs test had to be
accompanied by something like the new status test. Without such a limitation
every nonmaritime employee of any employer who had so much as one maritime
employee would be covered if he merely happened to be somewhere in a terminal,
shipyard or other adjoining area.
Id
94. See, e.g., Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 715 (1980); P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v.
Ford, 444 U.S. 69 (1979); Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249 (1977).
See also infra notes 104-19 and accompanying text.
95. 680 F.2d at 1038.
96. Id. at 1046. The Benefits Review Board supported the view "that the amended Act
does not exclude coverage from anyone who would have been covered under the original
Act; and thus that any injury upon the navigable waters is still compensable." Id see, e.g.,
Stewart v. Brown & Root, Inc., 7 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB) 356, 361 (1978), afl'don other
grounds sub nom. Brown & Root, Inc. v. Joyner, 607 F.2d 1087 (4th Cir. 1979) (benefits
under the LHWCA awarded to general excavation foreman who was killed, and painter
sandblaster who was injured, while working on a dry dock construction project); Weyer-
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the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 97 and the majority of
commentators in this area of the admiralty field, 98 the Boudreaux court
held that an employee injured on a water situs satisfies the "status" test
"because employment on the water is 'maritime employment' within the
meaning of the LHWCA both before and after its 1972 revision." 99 The
Boudreaux court was also critical of the restrictive Weyerhaeuser view for
borrowing its "significant relationship to commerce or navigation" test
from an inapposite Supreme Court decision."
Maintaining that the committee reports on the 1972 amendments
evinced legislative intent only to extend coverage,' the Fifth Circuit con-
cluded that the 1972 amendments did not decrease the traditional coverage
of workers injured "on navigable waters, who under the Act have been and
are considered to be in 'maritime employment.' ,102 The Boudreaux
court's abrupt departure from its previously narrow view of the 1972 "sta-
tus" test left the Fifth Circuit standing alone among the major maritime
haeuser v. Gilmore, 1 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB) 180, 182-83 (1974), rev'd, 528 F.2d 957
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 868 (1976).
97. 680 F.2d at 1046 n.22. The Director filed amicus briefs espousing the same liberal
view of the Act held by the Benefits Review Board in several decisions, and once favored
guidelines consistent with such a view. Id
98. Id. at 1046. "[Tihe majority view of the commentators, including the highly
respected Gilmore & Black, is that the amended Act does not exclude coverage from anyone
who would have been covered under the original Act .... " Id See, e.g., GILMORE &
BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 428-30 (1975); 1A BENEDICT, supra note 25, at § 17. "On
the basis that there can be nothing more maritime than the sea, every employment on the sea
or other navigable water should be considered as maritime employment." Id.; I NORRIS,
supra note 3, § 66, at 87. "The [1972 LHWCA] amendments are remedial legislation and, as
such, should receive a liberal interpretation. In the opinion of this writer, all who are en-
gaged in maritime employment [except those specifically barred in the Act's legislative his-
tory] should come within coverage of the Act." Id. Contra 4 A. LARSON, supra note 38, at
§ 89.41. "The addition of the 'status' test ... had both an expansive and constrictive ef-
fect. . . . The constrictive effect was to exclude from coverage . . . nonmaritime workers
whio before 1972. . . might have found themselves within the Longshoremen's Act through
the sheer accident of having been upon navigable waters at the time of injury." Id.; Tucker,
supra note 3, at 1062. "Thus, although the 'coverage' section of the Act was amended to
include employees whose injuries occurred landward of the Jensen line, the effect of the
change in the definition of 'employee,' was to exclude previously covered persons unless they
were engaged in 'maritime employment.'" Id (emphasis in original).
99. 680 F.2d at 1039 (emphasis in original).
100. Id at 1049. "Weyerhaeuser derived its 'significant relationship' test for coverage
. by direct quotation from Executive Jet v. City of Cleveland . . . . That decision is
inapposite to the issue now before us [because] . . . 'the fact that an aircraft happens to fall
in navigable waters is wholly fortuitous.'" (quoting from Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 267)
(citation omitted). See also supra note 77 and accompanying text.
101. Boudreaux, 680 F.2d at 1043, 1045-46, 1050.
102. Id at 1054.
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3. The Supreme Court: Ignoring the Problem of "Nonmaritime"
Employees Injired on Water
While the circuit courts were considering the impact of the 1972 "status"
requirement and addressing the issue of change in coverage after the 1972
amendments, the Supreme Court considered only cases involving workers
injured in the expanded shoreside situs provided by the Act. In Northeast
Marine Terminal v. Caputo,"° the Court had its first opportunity to inter-
pret the 1972 amendments. The issue before the Court was whether two
land-based marine terminal workers satisfied the "status" requirement of
the LHWCA even though their occupations were not expressly included
by Congress in expanding the coverage of the Act landward.,0 5 The work-
ers in Caputo would not have been covered by the Act before 1972 because
their injuries did not occur upon navigable waters. The Supreme Court
expressly withheld consideration of whether Congress, in enacting the
1972 amendments, intended to advance coverage to all workers who would
have been covered by the Act before 1972." Nonetheless, in holding that
the examples of covered workers given in the legislative history were not
exclusive, the Court dealt a setback to proponents of the restrictive view.'0 7
Two years later, the Supreme Court again reviewed the 1972 amend-
ments, this time issuing a decision subsequently interpreted by circuit
courts as supporting a restrictive view of the LHWCA. "8 In P.C Pfeiffer
103. See id (Gee, Garwood, JJ., dissenting).
104. 432 U.S. 249 (1977).
105. One worker, Blundo, was injured while marking barges unloaded from a ship. The
other worker, Caputo, was injured rolling a dolly loaded with ship's cargo onto a truck.
Relying on discerned congressional intent to expand the Act to cover marine workers lo-
cated on the shore, the Supreme Court held that both workers satisfied the requirements of
the "status" test.
106. 432 U.S. at 265 n.25. "This case also does not involve the question whether Con-
gress [in enacting the 1972 amendments] excluded people who would have been covered
before the 1972 amendments .... ." Id The Court suggested that language in the Act
made it clear that the "category of persons engaged in maritime employment includes more
than longshoremen and persons engaging in longshoring operations," but found it was un-
necessary to look beyond those two categories in deciding this particular case. Id
107. See, e.g., IA BENEDICT, supra note 25, at § 19, which notes that following Caputo,
"the maritime character of the employment is no longer of primary importance in determin-
ing whether an employee will receive compensation under the Act." Id
108. See, e.g., Fusco v. Perini North River Assocs., 622 F.2d 1111, 1112 (2d Cir. 1980)
(The Second Circuit reversed an earlier, broader position after the Supreme Court had va-
cated and remanded the case for consideration in light of P.C. Pfeiffer v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69
(1979). The Fusco court, in reversing, stated "[ft]he conclusion upon which our earlier opin-
ion rested has been rendered untenable by the holdings in P. C Pfeer V. Ford,. . . that...
the term 'maritime employment' refers to the nature of a worker's activities . . . and that it
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Co. v. Ford,'09 two land-based employees brought claims under the
LHWCA. I 0 The Supreme Court again avoided the issue of the scope of
the 1972 amendments because, as in Caputo, both employees involved in
the suit were shoreside workers who would not have been covered under
the original Act. The issue that the Court confronted in Pfeffer was
whether two shoreside employees involved in loading and unloading
goods recently delivered by ship engaged in "maritime employment." The
Court held that both workers satisfied the "status" test and were therefore
entitled to recover benefits under the LHWCA.'" In dicta, however, the
Court asserted that section 2(3) (the "status" provision) of the Act "re-
stricts the scope of coverage by further requiring that the injured worker
must have been engaged in 'maritime employment.' ,112 The Pfeffer
Court cited specific congressional language in support of its conclusion
that section 2(3) was meant to define the Act's occupational, not geo-
graphic, requirements." 
3
In 1980, the Supreme Court turned to the problem of drawing a new line
between state and federal jurisdiction in light of the 1972 expansion of the
Act. In Sun Shp v. Pennsylvania,"4 the Supreme Court held that a state
may apply its workers' compensation statute to injuries occurring in the
expanded shoreside situs of the LHWCA. Sun Ship involved five employ-
ees injured while conducting ship building and ship repairing activities on
the Delaware River. The workers filed claims under the Pennsylvania
State Workmen's Compensation Act even though they were also covered
under the LHWCA. The issue in Sun Ship was whether maritime employ-
is 'an occupational rather than a geographic concept.' "); Duncanson-Harrelson Co. v. Di-
rector, O.W.C.P., 644 F.2d 827, 830 (9th Cir. 1981) (The Ninth Circuit attributed to Pfeiffer
the rule that an employee can recover for injury "only if he was 'engaged in maritime em-
ployment' at the time of his injury."); but cf. Boudreaux v. American Workover, Inc., 680
F.2d 1034, 1047 (5th Cir. 1982) ("Ironically, the case that proved to be the catalyst for the
widespread acceptance of the restrictive Weyerhaeuser view regarding accidents upon the
actual water was the Supreme Court's decision in [P.C. Pfeiffer v.] Ford . . . a case that
actually expanded LHWCA shore-side coverage.").
109. 444 U.S. 69 (1979).
110. In Pfefer, one worker was injured during the course of fastening a recently deliv-
ered military vehicle onto a railroad flatcar. The other worker was injured unloading a bale
of cotton from a wagon into a pier warehouse. The Supreme Court held that both employ-
ees satisfied the LHWCA "status" requirement in allowing coverage. Id at 71, 84.
111. Id at 71.
112. Id. at 78 (emphasis added).
113. Id at 78 n.8. The Pfeiffier Court maintained that the actual language of the "situs"
requirement supports its conclusion that Congress focused on "occupation rather than loca-
tion" in formulating the "status" test. The Court stated that the expanded situs includes
specific areas adjoining navigable waters. Id.
114. 447 U.S. 715 (1980).
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ees injured on a proper landward situs could recover benefits under a state
compensation act despite clear LHWCA jurisdiction.
Relying heavily on Calbeck, 115 the Court stated that concurrent jurisdic-
tion of state and federal remedies should be allowed when the expanded
shoreside situs of the Act is involved. 16 The Sun Ship Court reasoned that
the line of demarcation between state and federal remedies in the ex-
panded situs is no clearer than the vague line drawn by the "maritime but
local" doctrine." 7 Contending that it could find no indication of congres-
sional intent to overturn the Calbeck decision or to require exclusive appli-
cation of a federal remedy, the Court found Congress' overall intent to aid
injured maritime workers sufficient to allow concurrent jurisdiction of
state and federal remedies.''
8
The impact of these earlier cases on circuit court decisions is significant
even though the Supreme Court never reached the problem of nonmari-
time employees. The Fifth Circuit, in Boudreaux, based much of its inclu-
sive interpretation of the 1972 amendments on the Supreme Court's
expansive view of the LHWCA as outlined in Sun Ship, Pfeiffer, and
Caputo."' Additionally, the Sun Ship decision served notice on the cir-
115. For a full discussion of Calbeck, see supra notes 42-55 and accompanying text.
116. 447 U.S. at 721.
117. Id at 725. See generally Pfeiffer, supra note 109; Caputo, supra note 104; 4 A. LAR-
SON, supra note 38, at § 89.70 ("What, if anything, did the 1972 amendments do to change
the law as to the 'twilight zone' and concurrent jurisdiction doctrines? The answer seems to
be: Factually, a great deal; legally, nothing.").
118. 447 U.S. at 725-26 ("The legislative policy animating the LHWCA's landward shift
was remedial; the amendments' framers acted out of solicitude for the workers."). See
Caputo, 432 U.S. at 268-72. The Caputo Court noted that the language of the 1972 amend-
ments was "broad and suggests that we should take an expansive view of the extended cov-
erage. Indeed, such a construction is appropriate for this remedial legislation." Id at 268.
In determining that the 1972 amendments were remedial legislation, Caputo relied on three
specific passages from the committee reports. First, the Court argued that a primary motiva-
tion underlying Congress' decision to extend the Act was that "'modem cargo-handling
techniques' had gradually moved much of a longshoreman's work off the vessel and onto the
land." Id at 269-70; S. REP., supra note 8, at 13; H.R. REP., supra note 8, at 10. Second, the
Court stated that Congress wanted a uniform compensation system to apply to workers who
otherwise would have been covered by the Act for part of their activity. 432 U.S. at 272; S.
REP., supra note 8, at 13; H.R. REP., supra note 8, at 10-11. Finally, the Caputo Court
determined that Congress sought a system that did not depend on the "fortuitous circum-
stance of whether the injury occurred on land or water." 432 U.S., at 272; S. REP., supra
note 8, at 13; H.R. REP., supra note 8, at 10. But see 4 A. LARSON, supra note 38, at § 89.41.
Although recognizing that the expansion of the Act landward may have been guided by
remedial motives, Larson suggests that those motives are irrelevant in a discussion of the
"status" test because the "status" provision was specifically inserted to exclude from cover-
age any "nonmaritime" personnel injured while "fortuitously" located on a covered situs of
the Act. Id.
119. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
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cuits that the Supreme Court considered the pre-1972 judicial history of
the Act important in interpreting the impact of the 1972 amendments. Fi-
nally, in liberally construing the Act's coverage of shoreside maritime em-
ployees excluded before 1972, these Supreme Court opinions served as
persuasive precedent for the Court's ultimate conclusion in Perini that the
amendments to the Act did not exclude nonmaritime employees covered
before 1972.
After ten years of examining and clarifying the impact of the expanded
shoreside situs of the LHWCA, the Supreme Court finally shifted its focus
to the Act's new "status" requirement, and particularly to the question
whether the 1972 amendments exclude nonmaritime employees who
would have been covered under the Act before 1972.
II. DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS V
PERINI NORTH RIVER ASSOCIATES: Attempting to Clarify the
Position of "Nonmaritime" Employees Under the
1972 Amendments to the LHWCA
A. Reconciling legislative intent and case history with public policy
In Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Perini,'20 the
Supreme Court for the first time confronted the issue of whether a non-
maritime employee who would have been covered under the LHWCA
before 1972 was excluded after the 1972 amendments. Justice O'Connor,
writing for the majority, held that Congress did not intend to withdraw
coverage from those workers who had been "traditionally" covered by the
LHWCA before 1972.121 Although the Supreme Court formulated a test
of LHWCA coverage under the "status" requirement that is within consti-
tutional guidelines, it manipulated the Act's plain meaning and justified its
action by relying on legislative history that is, at best, ambiguous.
In an exhaustive analysis of the 1972 legislative history, Justice
O'Connor maintained that Congress intended to "extend coverage to pro-
tect additional workers,"1 22 and that the Senate committee had expressly
provided that inclusion of the "status" requirement was not meant "to ex-
clude other employees traditionally covered" by the Act. 123 Additionally,
the Court asserted that "Congress. . . assumed that injuries occurring on
the actual navigable waters were covered, and would remain covered."'
' 24
120. 103 S. Ct. 634, 638 (1983).
121. Id at 637.
122. Id. at 647 (emphasis in original).
123. Id at 649.
124. Id at 648.
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Finally, the Court maintained that Congress, in abolishing the old section
3(a) requirement (prohibiting LHWCA coverage if recovery could be pro-
vided by state law)' 25 had demonstrated their intent not to limit coverage
to only those workers whose employment had a significant relation to nav-
igation or commerce on navigable waters. 26 In setting forth a broad view
of the Act, the O'Connor majority drew various inferences of congres-
sional intent from ambiguous legislative history. In order to justify these
inferences, the Court stressed congressional failure to explicitly overrule
the Court's own pre-1972 decisions.
27
In determining whether Congress intended to restrict coverage with the
addition of the 1972 "status" requirement, the Court examined its three
major decisions under the 1927 Act: Parker, Davis and Calbeck. 2 In
seeking support for an expansive view of the Act, the Court recounted the
confusion caused by the "maritime but local" doctrine and its codification
in section 3(a) of the 1927 LHWCA. 12 9 The majority then highlighted the
Court's attempts to correct the inequities that existed in the 1927 Act.
Turning to Calbeck, the Court noted that the Calbeck decision relied
partly on Davis to create an overlap between federal and state coverage of
injured workers and to allow maritime workers to recover for injuries sus-
tained on navigable waters with minimal hardship.130 Further, the Court
pointed to its decision in Parker and its holding that the Act covered a
land-based janitor injured on navigable waters.' 31 Finally, the Court ob-
served that the "consistent interpretation given to the LHWCA before
1972 by the Director [of the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs),
the deputy commissioners, the courts, and the commentators was that...
any worker injured upon navigable waters in the course of employment
was covered" by the LHWCA.132 The Court concluded, therefore, that
125. For further discussion of § 3(a), see supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
126. Id at 649.
127. Id. The Court argued that even though Congress did not mention any pre-1972
cases in the legislative history of the 1972 amendments, elected representatives, like other
citizens, know the law. The Court, therefore, concluded that Congress' use of 'employees
traditionally covered' must refer to those workers covered under the 1927 Act as a result of
Parker, Davis, and Calbeck. Id
128. Id at 642-45; see also supra notes 40-55 and accompanying text.
129. Id. at 642. See also supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
130. Id at 643.
131. Id at 644. The Court stated that Parker allowed a "nonmaritime" worker to re-
cover for an injury sustained on navigable waters "without any further inquiry whether the
injured worker's employment had a direct relation to navigation or commerce." Id
132. 103 S. Ct. at 644 (emphasis in original); see also GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 98,
at 429-30. Gilmore & Black assert that the pre-1972 case law on the scope of the 1927 Act
19831
Catholic University Law Review
Raymond Churchill (the foreman claimant in Perini) would have been
covered under the Act before 1972.
Turning to post-1972 case law interpreting the 1972 amendments, the
Court compared the contrasting positions of the various circuit courts as
reflected in the arguments of both Churchill 3 3 and Perini North River
Associates. Churchill argued that the addition of the "status" requirement
was meant to restrict coverage of workers injured on the expanded shore-
side situs. 13 4 Perini argued that the "situs" and "status" tests were to be
considered together, regardless of the site of injury, and that therefore a
worker may recover under the LHWCA only if his employment has a sig-
nificant relationship to navigation or commerce on navigable waters.'
35
The Court adopted Churchill's construction of the 1972 amendments and
thus affirmed the liberal interpretation previously adopted by the Fifth
Circuit.136 It reasoned that the LHWCA must be broadly construed to
avoid harsh results.'3 7 The Court therefore determined that since Con-
gress evinced no intent to withdraw coverage from those workers who
would have been covered before 1972, the intent and effect of the 1972
amendments was merely to extend the scope of the Act to cover additional
workers. 1
38
Addressing issues of public policy, the Court emphasized that a narrow
reading of the 1972 amendments would limit many employees injured on
navigable waters to state compensation remedies which Congress had
stood for the proposition that any worker injured on navigable waters was covered "without
any inquiry into what he was doing (or supposed to be doing) at the time of his injury."
It appears that, based on the extensive changes introduced by the 1972 amendments to the
LHWCA, the majority's emphasis on pre-1972 case law is misplaced. Clearly, the addition
of the "status" test in 1972 must have been intended to have some effect on the scope of the
Act. See Weyerhaeuser, supra note 75; 4 A. LARSON, supra notes 93, 98, 118.
133. Churchill was joined in his appeal to the Benefits Review Board by the Director,
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (O.W.C.P.) of the Dep't of Labor. The Director
participated as a respondent and filed a brief supporting Churchill's position before the Sec-
ond Circuit. Perini, 103 S. Ct. at 639. It was the Director who sought Supreme Court review
when the Second Circuit denied Churchill's claim. Thus, the Director of the O.W.C.P. as-
sumed Churchill's position before the Supreme Court. In addition to Churchill's primary
claim, the Supreme Court addressed the question of the Director's standing to seek review,
which the Court resolved in the Director's favor. Id at 639-41.
134. Perini, 103 S. Ct. at 646.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 646-47; see also discussion of Boudreaux, supra notes 91-103 and accompany-
ing text.
137. Id at 647; see Voris v. Eikel, 346 U.S. 328, 333 (1953) ("[The LHWCA] must be
liberally construed in conformance with its purpose, and in a way which avoids harsh and
incongruous results.")
138. Perini, 103 S. Ct. at 647.
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found to be often inadequate. 139 The Court also indicated, in a final foot-
note, that it expressed no opinion as to "whether [LHWCA]. . .coverage
extend[ed] to a worker injured while transiently or fortuitously upon ac-
tual navigable waters." 40 Interestingly, in a retreat from the main focus of
their argument, the O'Connor majority stated that its decision should not
be read as exempting water-based workers from the new status test.'
4'
Concluding its discussion, the Court pointed to its recent decision in Sun
Shop 142 as consistent with the interpretation of the 1972 amendments it
now advanced. According to the Court, the narrow view advocated by
Perini would require employees injured on navigable waters to meet both
"situs" and "status" tests, thus resurrecting the hazardous pre-Davis juris-
dictional guessing game. 143 The Sun Ship decision, in holding that the
1972 LHWCA amendments were intended to "supplemen[t], rather than
supplan[t], state compensation law," reflected the same broad view of those
amendments that the Perini Court now employed to resolve the meaning
of the "status" requirement.'"
In a brief concurrence, Justice Rehnquist avoided the difficult issue of
whether Congress intended to exclude workers previously covered under
the Act by categorizing Churchill's job as one that was "very much like the
work of longshoremen, who typically load and unload vessels."' 45 Inter-
estingly, Rehnquist's concurrence addressed the phrase in the "status" re-
quirement that workers are covered under the LHWCA if they engage in
longshoring operations or are harbor workers. Although the term "long-
shoring operations" generally has been interpreted broadly by the courts to
include many diverse occupations, 46 the term "harbor worker" generally
139. Id. at 648 n.28. See also S. REP., supra note 8, at 12-13; H.R. REP., supra note 8, at
10 ("[M]ost State Workmen's Compensation laws provide benefits which are inadequate.").
140. Perini, 103 S. Ct. at 651 n.34.
141. Id
142. See supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
143. Perini, 103 S. Ct. at 650. The jurisdictional guessing game would resurface if work-
ers injured on navigable waters had to satisfy a "status" test because an injured worker
would then have to guess whether his particular occupation met the requirements of the test.
144. Sun Ship, 447 U.S. at 720.
145. Perini, 103 S. Ct. at 652 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
146. See Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 269-70 (1977) (Con-
gressional intent "clearly indicates that [such tasks as stripping a container] are included in
the category of 'longshoring operations' [under § 902(3)]."); Hullinghorst Indus., Inc. v. Car-
roll, 650 F.2d 750, 756 (5th Cir. 1981) (Carpenter working to erect a scaffolding on a pier
"directly furthered the maritime goals of the ... port facility-the loading and unloading of
ships."); Brady-Hamilton Stevedore Co. v. Herron, 568 F.2d 137, 140 (9th Cir. 1978) ("[A]
gear lockerman's function is an 'integral and essential part of the overall longshoring opera-
tions.' "); Handcor, Inc. v. Director, O.W.C.P., 568 F.2d 143, 144 (9th Cir. 1978) ("[Tlhe
work of a [container] stuffer is the functional equivalent of loading cargo aboard [a] ship.");
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has been construed narrowly to include only those workers engaged in the
construction, repair or maintenance of a pier or a dock. 147 However, be-
cause Rehnquist viewed Churchill's work as "maritime" in nature, he did
not reach the question of the status of "nonmaritime" employees under the
Act.
Justice Stevens, in a lengthy dissent, criticized the majority's failure to
adhere to basic principles of statutory construction by maintaining that the
Court departed from the plain meaning of both the amendment's text of
the statute and its legislative history.' 48 Stevens, adopting the narrow view
of the Act taken by Perini and most lower courts, 49 noted that the title of
the Act itself suggests that a federal remedy is available only for longshore-
men and harbor workers.' 5 ° He concluded that coverage under the Act
must be determined by reference to both the situs and status tests. In Ste-
vens' view, these tests work together to provide compensation for only
those who perform longshore and ship repair work.' 5 '
Citing principles of statutory construction, Justice Stevens denounced a
broad view of the Act. According to Stevens, statutes generally should be
construed in light of specific examples provided to define terms.' 5 2 He
noted that the term "maritime employment" is consistently defined in the
Act by reference to the words "longshoremen" and "harbor workers".'
Valcin v. Schiavone & Sons, Inc., 8 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB) 384 (1977) ("A welder's
helper whose duties involved repair and maintenance of equipment used to load vessels...
[is] a maritime employee . . . since his . . . duties [are] an integral part of loading opera-
tions."); Carmitros v. B.T. Ilsley, Inc., 6 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB) 295, 296 (1977) (A
scaleman or weigher whose "duties involved an element of supervising in the unloading of
ships [and] weighing [of] cargo" is involved in the "traditional work of longshoremen.").
147. See Trotti & Thompson Co. v. Crawford, 631 F.2d 1214, 1222 (5th Cir. 1980) (An
employee constructing a wharf for future loading and unloading of vessels is covered under
the Act.); Brown & Root, Inc. v. Joyner, 607 F.2d 1087, 1089 (4th Cir. 1979) (An excavation
foreman and painter/sandblaster were found to be covered as harbor workers because they
were "directly involved in the construction . . . of harbor facilities."); Matson v. Perini
North River Assocs., 9 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. (MB) 967 (1979) (A crane operator involved in
the repair of a dock was covered under the Act.).
148. 103 S. Ct. at 652-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
149. See supra notes 71-86 and accompanying text.
150. Perini, 103 S. Ct. at 652.
151. Id In Steven's view, the coverage of the LHWCA "is defined by two basic tests-a
situs test focusing on the place where the injury occurred, and a status test focusing on the
character of the injured employee's occupation. An injured person is entitled to compensa-
tion under the Act only if he satisfies both tests at the time of injury." 1d.
152. Id. at 652-53. "The words 'other persons,' following in a statute the words 'ware-
houseman' and 'wharfinger,' must be understood to refer to other persons eusdem generis,
viz., those who are engaged in a like business, or who conduct the business of warehousemen
and wharfingers with some other pursuit, such as shipping . I..." Id  at 653 n.2. Accord J.
SUTHERLAND, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 273 (1891).
153. 103 S. Ct. at 652-53.
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Moreover, Stevens asserted that the definition of "employee" for purposes
of the Act should be independent of the situs of the injury. He rejected the
majority's contention that status should be analyzed only when the injury
occurs on a shoreside situs, noting that the statute itself fails to make such
a distinction. According to Stevens, a claimant must always satisfy both
tests to come within the scope of LHWCA coverage. 54
Referring to the legislative history of the Act, Justice Stevens, in a foot-
note, criticized the Court's assumption that the words "traditionally cov-
ered" were intended to refer to the claimants in Parker, Davis and
Calbeck . 5  Noting that none of these decisions were expressly mentioned
by Congress in the legislative history, Stevens interpreted the phrase "tra-
ditionally covered" as referring to longshoremen and harbor workers
whose work is clearly maritime in nature.' 56
Turning to the reasons for the Act's passage, Justice Stevens asserted
that Congress had passed the 1927 Act specifically to provide longshore-
men with a uniform remedy. 157 He pointed to House hearings on the 1972
amendments suggesting that Congress passed the amendments to protect
workers whose employment required them to be both on land and over
water.' 58 Testimony before the House revealed that only longshoremen
have this problem.1
59
154. Id at 652. Thus, under Stevens' view of the Act a litigant would have to prove: 1)
that he was injured on the proper situs covered by the Act; and 2) that he was engaging in an
activity substantially similar to longshoring, in order to recover any benefits under the Act.
It is not at all apparent that Congress favored such a restrictive view of the "status" test. It
does appear, however, from the plain and clear wording of the Act, that Congress intended
that workers satisfy both a situs and a status test in order to recover.
155. Id at 654 n.6; see also supra note 123 and accompanying text.
156. 103 S. Ct. at 654 n.6. Distinguishing the claimants in Parker, Davis, and Calbeck,
Stevens stated that in his opinion "the reference to the 'traditional coverage' of the Act [in
the committee reports) was intended to identify the coverage of longshoremen and harbor
workers as opposed to the special categories of coverage defined by specific statutory enact-
ment." Id For examples of the special categories referred to by Stevens, see Perini, 103 S.
Ct. at 652 n.l:
By reason of several specific statutory enactments, the LHWCA's compensation
scheme is, or has been, also applied to: (a) employees on defense bases . . .(b)
employees of nonappropriated fund instrumentalities such as post exchanges ...
(c) employees of government contractors injured overseas by war risk hazards...
(d) workers in the District of Columbia. . .and (e) workers on oil drilling rigs on
the outer continental shelf. ...
Id.
157. Perini, 103 S. Ct. at 656.
158. Id at 655-56 nn.10-11.
159. Id. at 655; see, e.g., Hearings Before the House Labor Subcommittee on HR. 12006,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. 297 (1972) (Joseph Leonard of the International Longshoremen's Asso-
ciation stated: "Federal compensation law stops at the gangplank to the pier. When you
come off the-gangplank you come under a different law; you come under the State.. . . The
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In a lengthy footnote, Justice Stevens highlighted two contradictions in
the majority's interpretation of the 1972 legislative history.'6 ° First, Ste-
vens observed that although the Court held that coverage under the Act
extended to any worker injured on navigable waters, it later retreated from
that broad assertion by stating that coverage might be denied workers in-
jured while "transiently or fortuitously" on navigable waters.' 61 Second,
he observed that although the Court interpreted congressional references
to workers "traditionally covered" to mean the plaintiffs in Parker, Davis
and Calbeck, it later declared that those cases did not limit the LHWCA to
only "traditional" maritime activities.1
62
In response to the majority's assertion that the deletion of the original
Act's section 3(a) requirement evinced congressional intent to retain cover-
age of all workers injured on navigable waters, Stevens countered that
Congress merely replaced the section 3(a) requirement with the new "sta-
tus" test, thereby leaving in place the exemption for those workers injured
on navigable waters who are engaged in "local" (nonmaritime) activi-
ties. 163 Turning to Calbeck and Davis, Stevens maintained that the estab-
lishment of a "twilight zone" of concurrent jurisdiction placed employers
in the position of having to acquire duplicate insurance coverage,' 64 pre-
sumably because of uncertainty as to which remedy an injured worker
would choose. Stevens concluded that Congress, concerned about uncer-
longshoremen are the only workers in the United States who must worry about their injury
to determine the compensation .. "). But cf. Miller v. Cent. Dispatch, 673 F.2d 773 (5th
Cir. 1982) (specialized maritime employee, required to be on ship five to six times a day,
walks in and out of LHWCA coverage); Holcomb v. Kirk, 655 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1981)
(watchman, injured on routine safety check of ship, walks in and out of LHWCA coverage).
160. Perini, 103 S. Ct. at 661 n.26.
161. Id,- see also id. at 651 n.34.
162. Id at 660-61 n.26; see also id at 644 n.21.
163. See id. at 659.
164. Id at 658-59. Stevens noted that Congress was concerned about duplicative insur-
ance costs when it amended the Act in 1972. He asserted that while LHWCA insurance
premiums were relatively low before 1972 because of the smaller amounts of benefits pro-
vided under the Act, after 1972 insurance costs necessarily rose because the amendments
generally increased benefits provided. Id at 659 n.22; see also Gardner, Remedies for Per-
sonal njuries to Seamen, Railroadmen, and Longshoremen, 71 HARV. L. REV. 438, 450 n.34
(1958) ("In preparing the [insurance] policy the scope of the insured's operations is deter-
mined and names of those states in which he is under the workmen's compensation law are
set forth. . . . If, in addition, he has exposure under the [LHWCA] our endorsement, Form
UC828, is added."); Note, Injured Maritime Workers and the "Twilight Zone," 50 CALIF. L.
REV. 342, 347 (1962) (Duplicative insurance coverage was not a problem because 44 states
permitted employers to self-insure. Thus, "the only extra expense to the employer for cover-
age under both [state and federal] acts [was] a small fee that the carriers charge for the
endorsement to the second act." (footnote omitted)). Stevens did not document to what
extent, if any, insurance costs have increased since 1972.
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tainty of coverage and duplicative insurance costs, replaced section 3(a)
with a "status" test which would define the scope of LHWCA coverage
more clearly therefore obviating the need for concurrent jurisdiction and
providing reduced insurance Costs.
165
Justice Stevens did not rely to a significant extent on case law before or
after 1972. He responded, however, to the majority's reliance on Parker.
The majority contended that allowing recovery by a nonmaritime em-
ployee in Parker demonstrated the Court's view that the 1927 Act covered
"nonmaritime" employees injured on navigable waters. Stevens declared
that the Parker decision was an aberration based on irrelevant equitable
considerations. 66 The injured employee in Parker had been unable to re-
cover under state law because his employer did not meet the statutory re-
quirements of the state workers' compensation act. 167 Stevens concluded
that Parker, the only case based on the original Act involving a "nonmari-
time" employee, 168 was devoid of convincing statutory analysis, and there-
fore did not provide a sound basis for the Perini majority's conclusion that
a nonmaritime employee such as Churchill would have been covered
before 1972 merely because he happened to be working on navigable wa-
ters when injured.
Justice Stevens concluded by reiterating his criticism of the Court's fail-
ure to give adequate consideration to the language of the statute itself. In
the absence of clearly expressed congressional intent to apply the 1972
"status" requirement to workers other than longshoremen and harbor
workers, Stevens found the statutory language conclusive. 69
B. Perini and Its Effect on the "Status" Test of the LHWCA
Although Perini provided courts with a fair and workable test of
LHWCA coverage which comports with constitutional notions of federal
admiralty jurisdiction, it engrafted an interpretation that departs from the
165. Perini, 103 S. Ct. at 659. Stevens stated: "Both of these concerns [duplicative insur-
ance costs and uncertainty of coverage] are alleviated by defining the scope of the statutory
coverage in terms of the status of the covered employee." Id.
166. Id at 660.
167. Id.; see also supra note 44 and accompanying text.
168. 103 S. Ct. at 656.
169. Id at 660-61; see also, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania,
447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980). This case involved a release of certain accident reports, pursuant
to a Freedom of Information Act request, allegedly in violation of the procedure established
for such disclosures in § 6(b)(l) of the Consumer Product Safety Act. In analyzing the re-
quirements of § 6(b)(1) the Court stated: "We begin with the familiar canon of statutory
construction that the starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute
itself. Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must
ordinarily be regarded as conclusive." Id
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plain meaning of the Act-a result at odds with traditional notions of judi-
cial review. Moreover, in interpreting the LHWCA, the Supreme Court
failed to demonstrate that its departure from the language of the text was
justified by indications of clear congressional intent.
Justice Rehnquist, concurring with the Perini majority, reached a con-
clusion that clearly is not supported by the facts of the Perini case. Rehn-
quist maintained that Churchill should be covered under the Act because
he engaged in the act of unloading at the time of injury-a task deemed to
be a "longshoring operation."' 70 Although the courts have defined the
term "longshoring operation" broadly to include various occupations, the
courts have also limited the expansive definition to occupations that can
demonstrate some link to the loading and unloading of ships.'7 Churchill
was supervising the unloading of a caisson from a barge that was to be
used as part of the substructure for a sewage treatment facility. A crane
operator performed the actual unloading. Thus, Churchill was a construc-
tion worker whose supervisory task was only an incidental function to his
primary job of constructing the substructure.
In the majority opinion, Justice O'Connor's assumption that Congress,
in cautioning that it did not intend to withdraw coverage from "tradition-
ally covered" workers was referring to the nonmaritime claimants in
Parker, Davis, and Calbeck,72 is without foundation. As Justice Stevens
noted in his dissent, Calbeck involved ship builders who are expressly in-
cluded by the statute.' 7 3 Davis concerned employees seeking state, not
federal coverage,1 74 and Parker seemed to turn on equitable rather than
analytic considerations.17 5 More importantly, Congress did not expressly
approve the Court's conclusions in any of these cases when considering the
1972 amendments.' 76 It is well established that congressional silence is an
unreliable indicator of acceptance of judicial decisions. 77 Viewed prop-
170. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 146.
172. Perini, 103 S. Ct. at 649; see also supra note 127 and accompanying text.
173. Perini, 103 S. Ct. at 654 n.6; see also supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
174. Perini, 103 S. Ct. at 654; see also supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
175. Perini, 103 S. Ct. at 654; see also supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
176. Perini, 103 S. Ct. at 654. "None of these cases was cited at any time in the [congres-
sional] hearings or reports." Id at 654 n.6.
177. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955). The Glen-
shaw Court refused to conclude that Congress meant to codify an earlier court decision
merely because, in reenacting a certain provision of the tax code with an amendment, Con-
gress failed to expressly disclaim the decision. The Court stated: "Re-enactment-particu-
larly without the slightest affirmative indication that Congress ever had the [particular]
decision before it-is an unreliable indicium at best." Id
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erly, Parker, Davis and Calbeck are irrelevant to a determination of legis-
lative intent underlying the 1972 "status" requirement.
Furthermore, the majority failed to consider the possible ramifications
of congressional silence. The majority cited the Senate committee report
for the proposition that Congress intended to extend the Act to protect
additional workers. 78 This statement does not necessarily preclude an in-
tent also to withdraw coverage from some workers. It is just as plausible
that in extending the Act to protect an additional class of workers on the
shoreside, Congress also may have acted to restrict the seaward coverage
of the Act.
17 9
The majority also maintained that a reading of the Act which so restricts
its coverage would force many workers to seek relief from inadequate state
compensation plans.' Although a strong policy argument, the more ap-
propriate remedy would be to seek modification of state compensation
statutes, not to apply the strained interpretation of the LHWCA proposed
by the majority. The Court's rationale is overly broad and might apply to
any circumstance in which an injured worker must seek relief from a state
remedial plan.
The Perini Court stated that Congress' deletion of the section 3(a) "mar-
itime but local" provision demonstrates that Congress no longer intended
that an injured employee prove that the nature of his employment is di-
rectly linked to navigation or commerce on navigable waters.' 8' However,
the majority did not consider Justice Stevens' well reasoned position that
Congress merely substituted the old section 3(a) provision with the new
section 2(3) "status" test.' 82 Indeed, the "status" test has had virtually the
same effect on post-1972 case law that the section 3(a) provision had on
pre-1972 case law.' 83 Interpreting the LHWCA as amended in 1972, the
Second Circuit, in Weyerhaeuser, reasoned that the "status" test requires
that an employee show a significant relationship between his employment
and a traditional ship's service in order to recover under the Act.' 84 Simi-
larly, in interpreting the LHWCA of 1927, commentators have suggested
that section 3(a) incorporated the "maritime but local" doctrine requiring
an employee to prove a direct link between his employment and naviga-
178. See supra note 122 and accompanying text; S. REP., supra note 8, at 1.
179. See 4 A. LARSON, supra note 38, at § 89.27(c). "[T]he expansion [of the LHWCA]
took place solely in the enlargement of the 'situs' covered. The additon of the 'status' test is
not an expansion but a contraction [of coverage]." Id
180. Perini, 103 S. Ct. at 648 n.8; see also supra note 139 and accompanying text.
181. See 103 S. Ct. at 649.
182. Id at 659; see also supra note 165 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 37-55 and accompanying text.
184. Weyerhaeuser, 528 F.2d at 961; see also supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
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tion or commerce upon navigable waters.'85
The Perini majority concluded that the LHWCA should be liberally
construed to avoid "harsh and incongruous" results. This expansive view
of the LHWCA can be traced to the Fifth Circuit's consideration of the
Act in Boudreaux.186 Perini, like Boudreaux, relied on earlier Supreme
Court cases as well as on commentary on admiralty law to formulate a
liberal construction of the Act.' 87 The extent to which the Perini majority
utilized Boudreaux's analysis is revealed by the Court's adoption of the
Boudreaux thesis that Congress did not intend to "withdraw coverage
from those previously considered to be in 'maritime employment'" and
that Congress meant to "extend coverage to protect additional workers."'
88
Though the Supreme Court in Perini reached the same result as the Fifth
Circuit in Boudreaux, the Boudreaux court arguably employed a better
reasoned analysis. The Perini majority might have avoided the difficulties
of its strained interpretation of the Act by finding, as the Boudreaux court
did, that any employee injured on navigable waters satisfies the "status"
test because employment on navigable waters is maritime employment per
se. 189 Instead, Perini suggests that a worker may recover under the
LHWCA without any inquiry whatsoever into his status if he is injured
upon navigable waters.
In effect, Perini changes the plain meaning of section 2(3) of the
LHWCA from requiring that all employees be engaged in maritime em-
ployment, to requiring that an employee be engaged in maritime employ-
ment only f he is injured on a shoreside situs. This new meaning imposed
by the Perini Court is, as Justice Stevens pointed out, unsupported by the
very terms of the "status" requirement, which does not differentiate be-
tween seaward and shoreside sites.
III. CONCLUSION
In Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Perini North
River Associates, the Supreme Court effectively deleted from the LHWCA
the section 2(3) "status" requirement as it pertains to workers injured on
actual navigable waters of the United States. The Court's generous view
of the 1972 amendments will clearly result in more workers being able to
recover benefits under the Act. At the same time, however, the Court's
means of expanding the Act without relying on clear congressional intent
185. See supra note 37.
186. 680 F.2d at 1039.
187. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
188. 680 F.2d at 1043 (quoting S. REP., supra note 8, at 1); see also supra note 102.
189. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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disturbs traditional notions of judicial review and implies an attempt at
judicial legislation.
Although the Court noted that it intended to express no opinion as to
the status of those workers injured while "transiently or fortuitously" upon
navigable waters, the broadness of the Court's decision in Perini virtually
assures an exception from the "status" requirement for these workers as
well. The Court's overly expansive view of the LHWCA controverts the
plain meaning of the Act, and restricts Congress' attempt to apply a test of
maritime status to all workers injured on the actual navigable waters of the
United States.
Roberto L Corrada

